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Introduction
At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, the alliance, across a number of issue-areas, 
reaffirmed its interest in expanding its outreach activities and partnerships. 
Whether it is the possibility of new partnerships on missile defense, the 
improvement of NATO’s Naval and cyber-defense capabilities to work 
more effectively with other international organizations, partners, or non-
partner states, or in general the backing for new partnerships, the Wales 
Summit Declaration expressed broad sentiment for an increasingly global 
military organization (Edström, Haaland and Petersson 2011). On future 
enlargement plans, most significantly the document states: 
NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies 
which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able 
to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, 
which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and 
whose inclusion will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance, judging 
each on its own merits (Wales Summit Declaration 2014).
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The Summit declaration was followed by expressing their ongoing support 
for the NATO membership aspirations of Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as by calling for a resolution to the ongoing debate 
between Greece and Macedonia over its name so that Macedonia can 
eventually join the alliance. In addition, President Obama continues to 
support the idea of enlargement, as do senior American officials (Obama 
2014; Nuland 2014). Thus, though reservations remain for any immediate 
membership expansion, by a number of measures it is clear that NATO 
intends to increasingly expand its partnerships, and will continue to assert 
an interest in having new members. 
When evaluating how NATO has expanded in previous enlargement 
rounds, the United States has often played the determinative role in 
shaping when and how many new members will be invited to join the 
alliance. At NATO’s Madrid Summit in 1997, it was U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright who announced that only three aspiring NATO allies 
would be invited to join NATO. After difficult and somewhat contentious 
diplomatic negotiations among the allies, she got what she initially 
promulgated (Asmus 2002). Similarly, when President George W. Bush first 
traveled to Europe in June 2001 and shocked the allies by announcing 
his desire to “erase the Yalta line” and advance a broad agenda for 
membership expansion, he got what he sought at NATO’s Prague Summit 
in 2002, when seven new allies were invited to join (Hendrickson and 
Spohr-Readman 2004).
Given the United States’ influential role in previous rounds, coupled 
with NATO’s ongoing interest in NATO expansion, this paper turns to the 
potential role that the United States Congress may play in shaping this 
political process. As is evident below, some members of Congress have 
demonstrated strong and meaningful interest in NATO enlargement and in 
NATO policies more generally (Petersson forthcoming). At times, especially 
in the lead up to NATO’s Madrid Summit in 1997, members of Congress 
played an important role in shaping American foreign policy and the 
larger strategic dialogue on NATO expansion. The evidence presented 
here, however, maintains that while some members of Congress have 
recently expressed interest in NATO expansion, few constituency political 
incentives exist for members to actively support enlargement. Thus, due 
to rather minimal issue saliency for most members of Congress, most 
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legislators remain disengaged from the issue, which will likely dampen 
efforts to expand NATO, and keep NATO membership at its current size. 
Moreover, since the crisis in the Ukraine, the enlargement issue has taken 
on a new partisan identity that may also limit the extent to which greater 
support for membership expansion develops in a substantive and more 
comprehensive way.
Literature Review
In discussing Congress’s foreign policy activities, and in particular with 
regard to congressional attention to NATO, at least four bodies of 
scholarship have been recognized as research that provides insight on 
what may inspire or generate legislative activism (Hendrickson 2015).1 One 
body of literature focuses on members of Congress interest in keeping their 
elected seat. Among the most notable scholars who made this claim, 
David Mayhew maintained that everything members of Congress do is 
generally motivated by their interest in getting reelected (Mayhew 1974). 
Mayhew’s views have found some support among foreign policy analysts, 
who argue that members of Congress will work to keep their constituencies 
pleased. Such activity may mean that members of Congress will extend 
their support to active and vocal interest groups in their districts (Rubenzer 
2011; Cutrone and Fordham 2010; Souva and Rohde 2007). Indeed, when 
members of Congress chose to support NATO’s first round of expansion in 
1998, they were targeted and aggressively lobbied by the Polish American 
Congress, the Hungarian-American Coalition, and other ethnic-American 
interest groups to support their desire to join NATO (Sloan 2003: 147).
Another body of scholars who address congressional foreign policy 
activism is those who identify partisanship as a key variable in explaining 
such behavior. A number of studies have found that members of Congress 
are indeed quite partisan on foreign policy issues (Carter and Scott 
2009; Johnson 2006; Auerswald and Matlzman 2003). Over the course of 
Congress’s historical relationship with NATO, however, few scholars point 
1 See especially chapter 5 for a similar analytical approach. 
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to the presence of strong partisan legislative activism. Certainly, many 
more republican members of Congress, rather than democrats, raised 
concern with President Clinton’s deployment of U.S. peacekeepers to 
NATO’s 1995 peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (Hendrickson 2002). Some 
republicans similarly opposed President Obama’s military strikes and 
coordination with the alliance during the NATO military operation in Libya 
in 2011, though opposition was not exclusively partisan either (Hendrickson 
2013). Yet in terms of Congress’s views on NATO’s strategic decisions in the 
past, partisan activities are difficult to identify. 
A third body of scholarship that may help explain Congress’s activities 
on NATO is a general deference to presidential decisions related to the 
alliance. Much scholarship on Congress, especially research that examines 
congressional views on American military policies and military actions 
abroad, argues that Congress often simply follows the president’s lead 
(Hendrickson 2015; Fisher 2013; Griffin 2013; Moss 2008; Ely 1990; Glennon 
1990; Weisman 1995; for an exception see Howell and Pevehouse 2007). 
This literature squares with findings that Congress was largely disengaged 
from NATO’s actions during much of the Bush presidency, as few members 
of Congress provided oversight of NATO’s activities in Afghanistan, or 
NATO’s operations in Darfur and Iraq (Hendrickson 2007). 
Congress’s oversight of the 2002 Prague Summit expansion round could 
also be categorized as deference to President George W. Bush as all 
senators, in unanimous fashion, went along with Bush’s expansion request 
(Nowlton 2003). In evaluating the possible new applicants to NATO, most 
senators focused on whether the applicant states had backed the United 
States and its war in Iraq, which appeared as the key assessment measure 
when senators rose to express their support for the expansion plan. Unlike 
the Senate’s discussions of the Madrid enlargement round, there was very 
little substantive debate over the strategic merits of adding the “Prague 
invitees” to the alliance (Hendrickson and Spohr-Readman 2003). In 
a similar degree of deference, the Senate approved of Albania’s and 
Croatia’s membership invitations in 2008 through a unanimous consent 
procedure, and thus entailed no debate or floor discussion of these 
applicant states (Congressional Record September 25, 2008). 
However, there have been cases in NATO’s history when individual 
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members of Congress have expressed strong interest in matters related to 
NATO, which squares with a fourth body of research that argues for simply 
the presence of some members’ personal policy interests as motivation 
for their activity on a particular foreign policy issue (Carter and Scott 2009; 
McCormick and Mitchell 2007; Burden 2007; Carter 2004; Hammond 1998). 
This body of scholarship could also be captured by noting that certain 
members of Congress may simply be motivated by their own unique 
personal beliefs on a certain set of issues that helps generate activism. For 
example, Senator Richard Lugar (R-In.) has been credited with leading 
the cause in Congress for NATO to reform itself upon the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, and as an early and strong advocate for NATO’s initial post Cold 
War enlargement (Sloan 2003: 147; Goldgeier 1999: 35). Indeed, in the 
Senate’s lead-up vote for the Madrid membership enlargement proposal 
in 1998, many members followed Lugar’s initial lead and engaged deeply 
in a deliberative and nonpartisan evaluation of the applicant states in 
question (Sloan 2003: 148-153; Goldgeier 1999: 145-151).
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) was another important independent legislative 
voice in often pushing NATO’s European allies to accept a greater share 
of defense spending burdens. Similarly, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mt.), 
in the 1960s, also often placed pressures on the allies by threatening the 
removal of American troops from European deployments (Kaplan 1984: 
27). Thus, across NATO’s lifespan, individual members of Congress have 
on occasion risen to express their concerns over NATO’s directions, and at 
times, have injected important and meaningful suggestions and pressures 
on their sitting presidents or the allies. Individual members of Congress can 
help drive and shape a foreign policy issue. 
In sum, four broad expectations of behavior can be extrapolated from 
this previous scholarship. First, if there is congressional activity, one may 
expect that such behavior may be inspired by constituency pressures and 
the desire to get reelected, all of which would suggest that this issue has 
higher electoral saliency. Second, if there is legislative activity on NATO 
enlargement, partisanship may be a factor that provides insight. Similarly, 
Congress may also engage in partisan challenges to the president. 
Third, if there is very little congressional activism, one may anticipate 
some degree of deference or silence on this issue, which often seems 
the case in national security affairs. Fourth, and finally, there may also be 
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individual members of Congress who have developed a strong interest 
in foreign policy issues, and thus perhaps have a long-standing interest 
in NATO enlargement, which would help advance or perhaps limit NATO 
enlargement, which was especially evident prior to the Madrid Summit 
enlargement.
At the same time, one must recognize that these categories of activities 
could easily overlap and are not mutually exclusive; a very partisan 
member of Congress may also have strong incentives to act in such 
a manner due to constituency pressures, especially if one is from a 
politically homogenous district. A personal policy interest could also very 
legitimately appear as a strongly partisan view of an issue, which makes 
it very difficult to determine why a member of Congress is taking a stand 
on an issue. Thus, determining the motives for these actions is very difficult, 
if not impossible, and thus some congressional foreign policy activity may 
overlap among these categories in the analysis that follows (McCormick 
and Mitchell 2007).
The rest of the paper examines congressional views on a potential next 
round of NATO enlargement, focusing mostly on activities in 2012, 2013 
and 2014. Searches were conducted of the Congressional Record, as well 
as Lexis-Nexis to identify members of Congress who advanced proposals 
regarding NATO enlargement. For this project, no committee hearings 
were examined, which potentially presents a limitation to this research, 
though perhaps not a significant limitation given how few congressional 
committees carried out oversight of NATO issues during the Bush presidency 
(Hendrickson 2007).
Constituency pressures 
Unlike the political processes that occurred surrounding the Senate’s 
debates over NATO Madrid Summit enlargement, among the aspiring 
and potential new members, there are few ethnic-American interest 
groups that yield significant influence in American domestic politics to 
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lobby on behalf of their home states. Among the possible candidates 
who were mentioned in the Wales Summit declaration, including 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, these states have 
weak domestic lobbies in the United States and thus few votes are to 
be gained by actively advancing enlargement on behalf of these states. 
This is a markedly different environment when compared to the number 
of Polish-Americans in the United States, who were well-organized and 
active across the United States during discussions of the Madrid expansion 
round (Goldgeier 1999: 52, 99).
One member of Congress, Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.), however, has views 
that appear to square closely with her district’s constituency related to 
NATO enlargement. Maloney, who serves as the founder and co-chair 
of the congressional caucus on Hellenic Issues notes: “I am privileged to 
represent a large population of Greeks in my New York City district, the 
city that is home to the largest Hellenic population outside of Greece and 
Cyprus” (Greek Reporter 2014). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that she 
has sided with Greece in the ongoing debate over the possible admission 
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into NATO, which was 
conditionally invited to join the alliance in 2008 at NATO’s Bucharest 
Summit upon some revision of its name, “Macedonia,” which the Greeks 
oppose (Congressional Record 2014).
In contrast, Congressman Mike Turner (R-Oh.), who has a long and sustained 
interest in NATO and NATO enlargement issues, was commended by 
the United Macedonia Diaspora (UMD) for his support of Macedonia’s 
potential membership in NATO. A UMD representative noted:
Ohio is home to some of the oldest Macedonian communities in the 
United States, where immigrants started arriving in the early 1900s to help 
build this great country…It’s encouraging to see Congressman Turner, a 
member of the Congressional Caucus on Macedonia, getting engaged in 
this way on behalf of his constituents (United Macedonia Diaspora 2012).
Apart from these examples, it is difficult to identify the presence of 
any meaningful political pressure on members of Congress to support 
membership expansion due to strong constituency pressures. Certainly, 
there may be small pockets of strong ethnic-American interest group 
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pressures placed upon some members of Congress to act on this issue, 
which another more comprehensive research approach may discover, 
but in this case, no members appear to reflect the “constituency pressure” 
position better than Congresswoman Maloney or Congressman Turner---
though Turner’s actions can also fall very legitimately into the following 
category of “personal policy interests.” In sum, due to the limited political 
and electoral incentives for engagement in this issue, NATO enlargement 
has rather low issue saliency, and thus few members of Congress who 
appear interested in NATO’s future expansion. 
Personal policy interests
To identify members of Congress who have a personal policy interest or 
a strong personal belief on NATO enlargement in the time period under 
analysis, one can assess if this person has expressed a sustained interest 
in the issue, and also may have exhibited some degree of bipartisan 
cooperation to help advance the cause. Two members of Congress 
who appear to fit this standard are Congressmen Michael Turner (R-Oh.), 
noted above, and Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.). Turner has served as a delegate 
to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since 2011, and currently serves as 
its President. Engel is the ranking minority member on the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, and has a long-standing interest in American foreign 
policy issues. 
Prior to the crisis in Crimea, Turner and Engel introduced a bipartisan 
proposal, signed by additional 38 members of Congress, which advanced 
a number of policies related to NATO enlargement. The proposal included 
the call for Montenegro to be invited to join the alliance; a resolution to 
the “Macedonia” name dispute in order to result in their membership in 
NATO; a compliment to Bosnia and Herzegovina for its activities in the 
Membership Action Program (MAP); for Georgia to be invited to join the 
MAP; and for Kosovo to become an active member of NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace. This proposal came in a letter sent to Secretary of State John 
Kerry, prior to the NATO’s Wales Summit, and included signatures from 
21 Republicans and 19 Democrats (Engel 2014). Congressman Turner, on 
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many occasions, has since reiterated these positions, both in the United 
States and abroad (Congressional Record 2014; Civil.ge 2012; German 
Marshall Fund 2014). Engel, too, has previously been engaged on NATO 
enlargement issues (Engel 2009). Thus, given the bipartisan nature of the 
proposal and these members’ sustained interest on this issue, a case can 
be made for their personal policy interests here.
In addition, Congressmen John Shimkus (R-IL) and Adam Schiff (D-CA), 
co-chairs of Congress’s Baltic Caucus, have also advanced various 
proposals for NATO expansion (Shimkus 2014; Shelbyville Daily News 
2014; Embassy of the United States, Lithuania 2014). Shimkus’s views are 
especially interesting given that he has noted that there are few political 
incentives for him to serve on this caucus, given the limited number of 
people in his district of Baltic descent. In fact, Shimkus noted that he was 
recruited by caucus supporters to join the organization, and thus implicitly 
noted that membership and support for the caucus was not something he 
had considered prior to joining (Shimkus 2014a). Like Congressman Turner, 
Shimkus also served as an American delegate to the NATO parliamentary 
Assembly, but has since resigned from this position. Nonetheless, while 
neither Shimkus nor Schiff appear to have as extensive records on this 
issue when compared to Turner and Engel, both have advanced policy 
positions that do not easily seem to correlate with district preferences or 
the presence of diaspora populations living in their districts, which suggests 
a personal policy interest in the issue.
One additional member of Congress who has demonstrated a sustained 
interest in NATO enlargement is Senator John McCain (R-AZ). Among 
members of the United States Senate, no other senator has generated 
as much media coverage on NATO enlargement. McCain’s views have 
been clear since prior to NATO’s Chicago Summit in 2012 and in the lead 
up to the Wales Summit in 2014. McCain has consistently advocated for 
NATO’s membership expansion. In 2012, prior to Chicago, McCain noted: 
We hear it said that this will not be an expansion summit. That is regrettable. 
We must make it clear to all of these countries, and any other country in 
Europe that wants to be a part of NATO and can meet the criteria, that 
the path to membership is open to them (quoted in Brannen 2012).
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McCain, along with Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) have also lobbied 
President Obama directly to expedite Georgia’s call for membership 
in NATO (Bennett 2013). McCain has also expressed backing for 
Montenegro’s request for membership as well (News Europe 2014). Thus, 
McCain is not new to this issue and has demonstrated a sustained interest 
in the cause. His positions, in the wake of the crisis in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine, however, appear to have taken on a more partisan quality, or at 
minimum, are more anti-Obama in their presentation.
Partisanship 
As noted above, it is very difficult to distinguish between a member’s personal 
policy interest in an issue, and a member’s ideological preferences that may 
appear to be quite partisan in nature. Thus, analytically this is very difficult to 
distinguish and categorize. There are at least three recent actions, however, 
in the wake of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine, that certainly have a 
more partisan complexion than the bipartisan proposals advanced earlier in 
2014 from Congressmen Engel and Turner. 
First, John McCain’s criticism of President Obama’s response to Russia’s 
invasion of Ukraine has been quite forceful. McCain has noted that “Obama 
Has Made America Look Weak” and that in this new security environment, it 
has been a mistake not to continue with NATO enlargement (McCain 2014).
McCain, along with GOP Senators John Barrasso (R-Wy) John Hoeven (R-N.D.) 
and Ron Johnson (R-Wi) also published an opinion editorial in the Washington 
Post, in which they noted:
The west must provide far greater diplomatic, economic and military 
support to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and other European countries 
that aspire to be part of our transatlantic community. We must show 
all of these countries that, as long as they meet the rightfully high 
standards for membership, the doors to NATO and the European 
Union remain open (McCain, Barrasso and Johnson 2014).
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While these positions may indeed have policy legitimacy, the fact that no 
democrats joined as co-authors, and only Republican Senators penned 
the editorial, suggests some measure of partisanship. 
Congressman Mike Turner (R-Oh) also became increasingly active on NATO 
enlargement issues in the wake of Russia’s new militarism. On 27 March, 
2014, Turner introduced the “NATO Alliance Recognition and Promotion 
Act” introduced by Congressman Mike Turner (R-Oh.), which simply called 
upon the House to appreciate the significant political gains produced 
through past enlargement rounds, and to continue with “enlargement 
activities.” His proposal was co-sponsored by nine republicans and only 
one democrat.2 Turner also introduced the “Forging Peace Through 
Strength in Ukraine and Transatlantic Alliance Act” on 9 April, 2014, which 
like his previous proposals, included calls for “NATO membership for 
Montenegro, a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia, a diplomatic 
solution to disputes between Macedonia and Greece, and [to] seek 
resolution to the constitutional issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (House 
Resolution 4433, 9 April 2014). It is notable that only two co-sponsors 
signed with Turner: Mike Rogers (R-Al) and Howard McKeon (R-Tx). Why no 
democrats co-sponsored the legislation is not apparent, though it is clear 
that only three republicans advanced the bill. 
In the Senate, apart from the media outreach efforts made by McCain 
and his fellow republicans, one response to the Ukraine crisis was led by 
Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the then ranking minority member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He, along with 22 GOP senators, 
called for a more aggressive and active policy toward Russia, which 
included the proposal to grant Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status to 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. While the distinction of being a MNNA 
is not the same as becoming a NATO ally, this proposal is nonetheless 
another means of moving the United States closer to these states (S. 
2277, 1 May 2014). Again, a notable feature of the proposal is that only 
republicans signed on as co-sponsors. 
In sum, some indications exist that suggest a heightened degree of 
partisanship present in both the House and Senate in the aftermath 
2 The one democrat was Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.). See House Resolution 4346 (27 March, 2014) at https://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/113/hr4346/text (Accessed 5 January, 2015). 
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of Russia’s action. The absence of bipartisanship is evident across 
these recent proposals, which introduces a new political dynamic into 
Congress’s domestic consideration of NATO’s future enlargement. 
Deference
As is clear from the data above, a number of members of Congress 
have expressed interest, and in some cases, sustained attention to the 
issue of NATO enlargement. In this sense, congressional activity is alive 
and well. At the same time, the congressional activity identified is from 
a rather small pool, which at its peak included 40 members of the House 
of Representatives, or less than ten percent of the chamber. Moreover, 
President Obama has not chosen to actively advance an enlargement 
agenda, which for most members of Congress, at least thus far, appears to 
be politically acceptable. Widespread opposition to Obama’s views does 
not exist, and those who are advocating for a different political direction do 
not appear to be gaining political traction. In this respect, most members 
of Congress, at least tacitly, appear to agree with President Obama, or 
are not engaged on the issue. Thus, as President Obama seems relatively 
unengaged on this issue, so too are most of the members of Congress. 
As noted above, this absence of interest may also be explained by the 
generally low issue saliency of NATO’s future enlargement.
Perhaps the diplomatic complexity of the Russian-Ukraine issue has 
pushed the NATO enlargement question to the wayside for now, and 
given the more partisan complexion of how NATO enlargement is now 
being presented by some members of Congress, many members-- 
especially democrats--are choosing to simply follow President Obama’s 
lead and not inject new positions into the wider debate over how to 
manage this crisis. Thus, deference, especially from the House and Senate 
Democrats, appears to be the chosen strategy on the specific issue of 
NATO enlargement at this time. 
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Conclusion
Congress’s attention to NATO’s possible membership expansion can, in 
part, be explained by four bodies of scholarship on congressional foreign 
policy activism. First, the evidence presented here suggests that the vast 
majority of members of Congress is either content with the current status 
of NATO enlargement or is simply not engaged in this issue. These findings 
lend support to the literature that views Congress as largely deferential 
to the president in foreign policy. In the last three years, both houses of 
Congress have generated no major legislative initiatives to help shape the 
debate over NATO’s future enlargement. It is clear that as an institution, 
Congress is not pushing a new enlargement agenda. 
Second, some of this deference may be shaped by the few electoral 
incentives and low issue saliency in place that may be necessary to 
generate enthusiasm for this issue, which also lends credence to those 
scholars, like David Mayhew (1974), who argue that members of Congress 
remain focused most importantly on reelection. Given the small ethnic 
American diaspora(s) that exists in the United States, working to advance 
their home-states’ cause for membership in NATO, the political incentives 
are simply not there to inspire major and sustained efforts to encourage 
another round of NATO enlargement. 
At the same time, there indeed are pockets of congressional activity 
related to NATO enlargement, which help lend support to the idea 
that indeed there are members of Congress who have a personal 
policy interest in NATO’s enlargement. The 2014 proposal advanced by 
Congressmen Engel and Turner offers the most substantive and bipartisan 
example of Congress’s interest in future expansion. These efforts, however, 
have become subsumed by a more polarized debate and presentation 
of NATO enlargement, as Republicans have become somewhat more 
active in advancing NATO enlargement proposals, while Democrats have 
distanced themselves from such initiatives. This heightened partisanship 
will likely make it more difficult to advance this issue and generate wider 
support for the cause in the United States Senate, especially as Senator 
John McCain (R-Az.), rightly or wrongly, becomes increasingly more 
outspoken on President Obama’s diplomatic initiatives on Ukraine. Thus, 
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partisanship has now arguably crept into the question of NATO expansion, 
which scholars have identified as another variable in congressional 
activism. In sum, all four bodies of previous scholarship on congressional 
foreign policy activism (or deference) help provide some insight on how 
Congress may shape the next possible round of NATO’s expansion. 
All of these findings suggest that NATO is unlikely to enlarge in the near 
future. As most members of Congress appear to be deferring to President 
Obama on this issue, and as Obama appears relatively unengaged, 
NATO is unlikely to expand its membership. Indeed, as demonstrated 
above, some members of Congress are engaged on this issue, but given 
how few political incentives exist, the status quo seems like a probable 
scenario in the near future. Among the candidates who seek admission, 
Montenegro seems the most likely, given that in the past, both democrats 
and republicans have expressed support for this country. In the event 
the President Obama and the NATO allies proposed Montenegro as a 
new member, as long as partisanship does not overwhelm congressional 
dialogue and debate of this issue, Congress would likely defer to 
Obama’s wishes. Otherwise, it is difficult to foresee a serious policy effort 
from Obama or the Congress to enlarge NATO, especially given the few 
domestic political and electoral incentives for doing so. 
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